The V-22 Osprey: a case analysis by O'Brien, Mark Anthony
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1992-06
The V-22 Osprey: a case analysis
O'Brien, Mark Anthony








Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
The V-22 Osprey: A Case Analysis
by
Mark Anthony 9' Br i en
Lieutenant Commander, Royal Australian Navy
Bachelor of Business Administration,
University of Southern Queensland 1981
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of










DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
ERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)








3 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILA8ILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited
5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
ADDRESS {Oty, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (City. State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, Ca 93943-5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









TITLE (Include Security Classification)











The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S.
COSATI CODES
FIELD GROUP SU8-GROUP
18 SU8JECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
V-22, Tilt-rotor, Civil and Foreign Military Sales,
Performance Characteristics, Economic and Political
Issues, Cost and Performance Comparisons, Simulations
ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis Is a case analysis of the V-22 Osprey program. It examines the history of UK-rotor technology, as wel
(he history of the program management Congressional, OSD and USMC/USN Interplay Is detailed chronologically from
80 through to 1901 with particular reference to Congressional action during this period. Various studies and sknuiaSons
) analyzed with the objective of establishing the V-22 as an aircraft which Is capable of fulfilling wide-ranging mission
terla established by the Services much more effectively and efflcientty than current or planned aircraft. The commerciai
d foreign military sales markets for the V-22 are also examined. This thesis concludes (hat the Hit-rotor concept has
nsiderable worldwide potential for both military and cfvil applications.
DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
9 UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED SAME AS RPT D DTIC USERS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified
NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
Alan W. McMasters




:orm 1473. JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete
S/N 0102-LF-014-6603
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
ABSTRACT
This thesis is a case analysis of the V-22 Osprey program.
It examines the history of tilt-rotor technology, as well as the
history of the program management. Congressional, OSD and
USMC/USN interplay is detailed chronologically from 1980 through
to 1991 with particular reference to Congressional action during
this period. Various studies and simulations are analyzed with
the objective of establishing the V-22 as an aircraft which is
capable of fulfilling wide-ranging mission criteria established
by the Services much more effectively and efficiently than
current or planned aircraft. The commercial and foreign military
sales markets for the V-22 are also examined. This thesis
concludes that the tilt-rotor concept has considerable worldwide










HISTORY OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT. 9
IV. CONGRESSIONAL, OSD, USMC/USN INTERPLAY 17
A. EARLY CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY (1980-1987) 17
B. PROGRAM CANCELLATION AND EVENTS LEADING
UP TO IT (1988-1989) 19
C. PROGRAM CANCELLATION AND SUBSEQUENT
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 20
D. 1990 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 22
E. 1991 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 26
F
.
FY92 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 28
V V-22 VS ALTERNATIVES . 29
A . INTRODUCTION 29
B . LLNL STUDY 30
C . IDA STUDY 34
D BDM INTERNATIONAL STUDY 38
E. SUMMARY OF LLNL, IDA AND BDM STUDIES 40
F. V-22 PECULIAR SUPPORT EQUIPMENT COMPARISON . 41
G. SPECIFIC INCIDENTS WHICH NEEDED THE V-22 ... 42
VI. CIVILIAN AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES POTENTIAL... 47
VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 60
APPENDIX A V-22 FIRSTS 66
APPENDIX B AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS 67
APPENDIX C CONGRESSIONAL TILT-ROTOR
TECHNOLOGY COALITION 77
APPENDIX D STUDY OF THE V-22'S POTENTIAL
IN DESERT SHIELD/STORM
By LtGen. Keith Smith,
USMC (Ret) 79
APPENDIX E CIVIL TILT ROTOR
CONFIGURATIONS 84




"The Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey Program is one of the
most ambitious aviation acquisition programs in
history. The challenge of integrating three new or
relatively new technologies (ie. tilt-rotors, all
composite airframe, and fly-by-wire digital controls),
makes the V-22 Program one of our 'highest tech'
aviation acquisition programs. To date, the Osprey's
tilt-rotor technology has yet to be integrated
successfully into either a commercial or military
aircraft [Ref . l:p. 4]
The above statement was based on an analysis of the V-22
Dsprey Program conducted in 1988. Three years and five
prototypes later, the status of the V-22 Osprey remains much the
same and the future remains unclear. Although the program was
adequately funded through fiscal year 1989 ($333.9 million ini
advance procurement funding was appropriated for the pilot
production long lead time efforts) , the V-22 Program is currently
in a deadlock status. In an amended fiscal year 1990 budget
submission, the Secretary of Defense deleted the program due to
its high cost relative to its fairly narrow mission, stating the
mission could be performed by helicopters. Subsequently,
Congress restored Research & Development funds through fiscal
year 1990, but delayed a decision on production funding [Ref.
2:p. 1].
This thesis will review the V-22 Program and analyze the
events leading up to its current status in hopes of providing a
better understanding of how and why it is such a controversial
issue
.
The thesis is divided into six chapters: This chapter is a
brief introduction. Chapter II will discuss the background and
chronological events leading up to concept formulation of the
V-22 Program (Milestone 0). Chapter III will analyze program
management, contractual developments and acquisition strategy
(Milestone through Milestone II). Chapter IV will discuss the
interface between Congress, the Department of Defense, and the
Marine Corp/Navy while providing an in-depth look at the
Congressional history of the program. Chapter V will analyze and
compare the V-22 against proposed alternates. Missions
investigated include Combat Support, Combat Search and Rescue
(CSAR) , Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) , and Special Operations.
Jrimary emphasis is on the Combat Support or Marine Corps
lissions as the Marine Corps is the lead service for the program.
Ihapter VI will analyze the commercial potential of the
:ilt-rotor concept and detail opportunities available to the
:ontractors apart from the military procurement program,
ncluding a brief analysis of Australian requirements. Chapter
rII discusses conclusions and recommendations on the program's
dstory and possible future. Included in Appendix A is a list of
V-22 Firsts" contributed by the Bell-Boeing team.
I I
. BACKGROUND
The V-22 is a tilt-rotor aircraft designed to take off and
land vertically like a helicopter and to fly like an airplane by
tilting its wing-mounted rotors forward to function as
propellers. The V-22 is being developed in a joint effort by
Bell Helicopter Textron based in Fort Worth Texas and the Boeing
Company based in Seattle Washington. It will be required to
perform various combat missions, including medium lift assault
for the Marine Corps, combat search and rescue for the Navy, and
long range special operations for the Air Force. Details of the
aircraft's characteristics are shown in Appendix B.
The concept of the tilt-rotor aircraft is almost as old as
the commercial helicopter, formulated at Bell Helicopter in the
late 1940" s. "Conceptually, this helicopter/airplane could go
twice as far and twice as fast as a comparable sized helicopter -
on the same amount of fuel. It would have twin 3-bladed rotor
systems mounted at the tips of the wing. In the helicopter mode
the rotor blades would rotate in a horizontal plane. Then, during
forward flight, the rotor hub would be tilted forward 90 degrees
and the rotor blades would rotate in a vertical plane like an
airplane propeller. Thus, the basic concept of the tilt-rotor
was born [Ref. 3:p..l]."
Evolution of the V-22 Osprey Program continued through the
1950's with the design and development of Bell Helicopter's XV-3,
the first tilt-rotor aircraft to successfully convert from
lelicopter to fixed wing aircraft. This first in-flight
inversion took place on 18 December 1958.
The XV-15, a follow-on to the XV-3 tilt-rotor program, was
initiated even prior to the XV-3 program's completion: "Research
md development continued during the 1960*3 but with little
government assistance. In 1972, the Department of the Army and
MSA awarded Bell Helicopter a contract to develop two tilt-rotor
iemonstrators designated XV-15' s. In April of 1977, the XV-15
nade its first hover flight and, in July 1979, a full in-flight
:onversion from helicopter to fixed wing. In 1980, both
Iemonstrators met their predicted speed and altitude of 300 knots
uid 16000 feet respectively [Ref. 4:p. 5]."
Although the tilt-rotor concept was gaining interest,
progress was slow. The Iran hostage situation in 1980
lemonstrated the definite need for an aircraft with the
capabilities projected of the V-22 Osprey. Timing of the
levelopment was not right however, forcing the U.S. to rely on
the Sikorshy RH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter for the hostage rescue
ittempt in Iran. Unfortunately, the RH-53 Sea Stallions proved
to be the weak link in the operation and the Iran rescue mission
failed; the RH-53 aircraft were incapable of accommodating the
rescue mission's weight and flight requirement. In the case of
the Iran rescue mission, "the 900 miles of desert exceeded the
operational range of all helicopters. A transport aircraft, such
as the C-130, was not acceptable because it could be easily
detected when landing near Teheran. The U.S. needed an aircraft
capable of landing and taking off in a small secure area and
flying undetected over a great distance. The U.S. needed ax:
aircraft with the capabilities of the multi-service V-22
tilt-rotor aircraft currently undergoing acquisition. With
tactical aerial refueling capabilities similar to the C-130's,
the V-22 could have flown secretly across the Iranian desert at
200 knots in its airplane configuration, transformed to its
helicopter mode, and landed undetected in a secure confined area
near Teheran [Ref. l:p. 2]. n
Possibly, as a consequence of the unsuccessful Iran rescue
mission in 1980, the year 1981 proved to be a major progressive
leap in the evolution of the V-22 Osprey Program. Following an
impressive demonstration on the XV-15 at a 1981 Paris Air Show,
the then Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, directed the Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) to pursue the possible option of the
XV-15 as a viable solution to the Marine Corp ' s aging H-46 fleet
of helicopters. NAVAIR established the HXM Helicopter Weapon
System Project Office in March 1982 with the first progran
manager assigned in June. By December of 1981, the Milestone C
of the acquisition process had been achieved: "The Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) sent
a memorandum to the Service Secretaries suggesting that the
multiple rotary wing missions of the Army, Air Force, Marines and
Navy might best be accomplished by a single advanced aircraft
such as the XV-15. In December on 1981, the Secretary of Defense
issued a memorandum establishing the Joint Services Aircraft
program, JVX. This was regarded as approval for concept
formulation, waiving the need for a formal need statement [Ref.
4:p. 6]."
On 7 June 1982, Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. and Boeing
/ertol Company announced a teaming agreement to participate
jointly in the JVX Program and, six months later, the JVX Joint
Services Operational Requirement was published.
The JVX aircraft was officially designated "Osprey" by
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, in January 1985. "The Osprey
Ls an ocean hunting member of the hawk family found throughout
:he world. It is noted for its agility, powerful wings, and
3wift flight. The military designation, V-22, was assigned to
the new tilt-rotor. The U.S. Marine Corp's aircraft (MV-22A)
"/ill allow combat assault of 24 troops. The U.S. Navy's aircraft
(HV-22A) will provide a combat search and rescue capability. The
J.S. Air Force needs a Special Operations Aircraft (CV-22A) , and
:he U.S. Army (MV-22A) requires and aeromedical evacuation,
itility and logistics aircraft. The U.S. Navy is also studying
in ASW version [Ref. 3:p. 4]."
May 1988 marked an historical point for the V-22 Osprey, for
It was on this date that the Osprey took its maiden flight.
3etween this significant first flight and the middle of 1991,
bhere have been five V-22's flown and 550 flight hours
Accumulated. The V-22 flight test program had proceeded along
3moothly until 11 June 1991 when MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor
prototype No. 5 crashed just three minutes after its first flight
lift-off. Despite this setback, Congress is still providing
strong support for the V-22 Program, as evidenced by the
inclusion of funding for the program in the FY90 thru FY92
budgets
.
III. HISTORY OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
As discussed in Chapter II, there was a Joint Memorandum of
nderstanding between the service secretaries establishing the
ilt—rotor aircraft weapon system acquisition program in August
981. Following that August 1981 memorandum was a memorandum
rom the Deputy Secretary of Defense on December 30, 1981, which
ormally established the Joint Services Aircraft Program. Each
ervice took this as approval for concept formulation which would
aive the need for a formal need statement. Within the life
ycle process for a weapon system acquisition, this served to
ulfill Milestone 0. This was arguably the first time that a
ingle aircraft had been identified with the multi-mission
apability to serve the needs of all four services. The Deputy
ecretary of Defense backed the Army as the executive service and
ppointed a Marine officer as the initial program manager. With
he Army as the executive service the program would be executed
sing the standard Army development and acquisition procedures
Ref . 5:p. 4]
.
Each service agreed to reprogram $1.5 million to conduct a
oint technical assessment of the technology available for this
rogram. Under this assessment, in addition to the tilt-rotor,
ther technologies were to be examined. Among those were
onventional helicopters, compound helicopters, the advancing
ilade concept and the lift/cruise fan concept. The tilt-rotor
loncept had the fewest drawbacks or conversely the most pluses of
the technologies examined. Specifically, the lift-cruise fan was
not fuel efficient; the helicopter could not meet all the mission
requirements for range, speed and maneuverability; and the
compound helicopter was heavier and had less hover efficiency.
The tilt-rotor's strongest points were in terms of speed and
worldwide self-deployabi lity [Ref. 6:p. 22].
In June 1982, the Army Chief of Staff (because the Army was
the executive service as appointed by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense) formally announced the selection of the Joint Services
Aircraft program manager which the Deputy Secretary of Defense
had previously endorsed. The only formal training in program
management this Marine officer had consisted of a three-week
Executive Refresher Course and the twenty-week Program Management
Course given by the Defense Systems Management College. Although
a highly qualified aviator with a bachelor's degree in Electrical
Engineering and a master's degree in Management, this was his
first assignment as a program manager.
On June 4, 1982, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed
for the Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft
Development Program (JVX) by the Secretary's of the Army, Navy
and Air Force. There were three specific objectives of this
particular Memorandum:
(1) Development of a common advanced technology vertical
lift aircraft meeting multi-mission service requirements
while achieving a significant increase in performance over
current aircraft.
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(2) Reducing Department of Defense costs through execution
of a joint development program for a common aircraft.
(3) Achievement of the earliest practical Initial
Operational Capability (IOC).
IOC tends to be the most crucial date in any weapon system
acquisition. The inclusion of the "earliest practical IOC"
statement in this Memorandum would seemingly indicate the
program's importance to the services. Also included in this
Memorandum were development funds for FY 1984 totaling $167
nillion and conditional funding approval (for planning purposes)
Eor the rest of the development program. The shared funding was
livided between the services as follows: Army - 46%; Navy - 42%;
Mr Force - 12%. A panel of Flag Officers was also established
bo oversee the program, resolve program issues and report back to
bheir respective services [Ref. 7:p. 23].
During 1982 a Joint Services Operational Requirement (JSOR)
*as developed. This document identified ten service specific
nissions plus a joint requirement for self deployment for which
bhe common KVX would be designed. This JSOR was approved in
December 1982. Subsequent to that agreement, four missions were
leleted in August 1984 and four other missions were added. With
respect to aircraft specifics, the requirements called for an
aircraft with a cruise speed of 250 knots and a minimum range or
2100 nautical miles, unrefueled. The anticipated buy for the




Milestone I was reached in December of 1982 with the
approval to proceed with the JVX by the Under Secretary of
Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved an acquisition
strategy for the Joint Services Aircraft on December 8, 1982
which NAVAIR (as the program manager) signed in January 1983.
This strategy included risk reduction techniques as follows: use
design, wind tunnel, and flight test data already developed
during the Army/NASA XV-15 tilt-rotor program; encourage
industrial teaming; and competing the preliminary design effort.
This strategy also dismissed the requirement for a formal review
of the program as required by DOD Directive 5000.1 since the
Defense Acquisition Executive had approved the acquisition
strategy. The Joint Services Aircraft did not require a separate
demonstration and validation phase [Ref. 8:p. 31].
On December 13, 1982, the Secretary of the Navy approved an
addendum to the June 4, 1982 Memorandum of Understanding
designating the Navy as the executive service for the aircraft
replacing the Army. According to the program manager, the Army
deferred to the Navy regarding the IOC and the Marines (as part
of the department of the Navy) had the most pressing need for an
early IOC date. The Under Secretary of Defense (Research and
Engineering) directed the Navy to take the executive service lead
on December 27, 1982, but only for the airframe with the Army
continuing as the executive" service for the development of the
modern technology engine. This memorandum also shifted the cost
sharing proportions established in the original memorandum to:
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Navy - 50% (up from 42%) , Army - 34% (down from 48%) , and Air
Force - 16% (up from 12%) . After the Navy took over as the
executive service, the NAVAIR contracting officer, the Assistant
Commander for Contracts (DOD) , and legal counsel changed the
contracting strategy from fixed-price level of effort to a
cost-plus-fee arrangement [Ref. 8:p. 33].
The first Navy contracting officer was named in December
1982. This officer had been the contracting officer for three
other programs, but had also been the Navy contracting officer
for the Navy's forerunner to the Joint program. The second
contracting officer was appointed by the Navy in February 1983.
Subsequent contracting officers were from either the Navy or the
Marine Corps.
Following the release of the final request for proposals for
preliminary design work in January 1983, the contract for
preliminary design was awarded to Bell-Boeing in April of 1983.
Although the Navy anticipated two contractors would compete
during the design stage, the Bell-Boeing team proposal was the
only one received. The other anticipated proposal was expected
to come from Sikorsky Aircraft but, despite an eight-month
extension to the design stage, the proposal from Sikorsky failed
to materialize.
In May 1983 the Army withdrew from the joint program.
However, they rejoined the team in September 1983 after a Defense
Resources Board meeting. This Board approved continuing with a
fully funded Joint program for the JVX . The program continued in
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design development in 1984 with the combined Bell-Boeing team and
the support of Congressional funding. The total number of
aircraft projected for the program at this point was 913 (down
from the originally anticipated 1100) with a unit cost of $14.6
million in 1983 dollars according to the Navy's acquisition
strategy of December 1982. In January 1985 the Secretary of The
Navy selected the name for the JVX to be the "OSPREY" with the
first flight rescheduled for June 1988 and IOC planned for
December 1991 [Ref. 8:p. 39].
In March 1985, a decision was made by the Secretary of the
Navy to develop the OSPREY V-22 under a fixed-price incentive
contract. This was the third shift of contracting type in its
short history. When the full-scale development contract was
awarded on May 2, 1986, Milestone II in the DOD acquisition
process was completed. Six aircraft were ordered into full-scale
development
.
Coincidentally , the Navy's acquisition strategy was under
evaluation from Congressional and House committees' concerned
with waste and inefficiency.
Although the teaming agreement was to maintain the
Bell-Boeing team with joint production through at least the fifth
year from initial production delivery, top Navy management
expressed a desire to have Bell-Boeing begin competing with the
first production lot. The decision on when to have the two
businesses compete, if at all, is still open for negotiation
between the Navy and the contractors [Ref. 8:p. 39]. In all
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Likelihood the final production contract will be effectively dual
sourcing with the contractors being a Bell-Boeing consortium.
Congress funded the program for Fiscal Year 1986 through
L991 to the total of $2.7 billion of which $2.2 billion has been
for research, development test, and evaluation [Ref. 9:p.8]. The
Eirst flight of the V-22 OSPREY took place on Sunday March 19,
L989.
In the Secretary of Defense's submission of the Fiscal Year
L990 budget, he deleted the entire program, saying the cost of
:he program was too high compared to its relatively narrow
nission. When he cancelled the program, he also directed that
J200 million of the Fiscal Year 1989 procurement funds to be
re-obligated.
So what is the program status as of November 1991? The
program remains in the development stage and is not currently
ready for production, The major problems identified thus far
*ith the program, although there are many minor issues, are with
:he weight, vibrations, display latency and software development.
Additionally, the program has grown in cost. The total
production cost, as of April 1991 estimates for 657 aircraft, is
low $23.3 billion or $40 million per aircraft excluding engines.
(It was $14 million in 1983). It is interesting to note that the
:otal planned aircraft procurement had shrunk from over 1000 to
557 at the time the production portion of the contract was
:ancelled. It is now generally accepted that yet a much smaller




A potentially major blow to the program occurred on Tuesday,
June 11, 1991, when the fifth prototype aircraft crashed just
about three minutes into its flight in Wilmington, Delaware. It
has since been determined that some faulty wiring to a gyro
device caused reverse polarity resulting in bad flight control
system inputs, and thus should have had little or no detrimental
effect on the program as a whole [Ref. 10:p. 14].
The program manager is convinced the problems in the
developmental craft can be fixed in production models. Congress
is also still behind the aircraft at this time (June 1992). The
Secretary of Defense, however, does not feel he can afford the
program and continues to not include the V-22 in his budgets.
Faced with this instability, Bell-Boeing is actively promoting
the potential civilian applications for tilt-rotor technology.
Chapter VI examines these non-military aspects and identifies
them as a potential alternative. That chapter also considers the
markets of foreign military services.
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL, OSD, USMC/USN INTERPLAYS
A. EARLY CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY (1980 to 1987)
As discussed earlier, the V-22 procurement program grew out
of a Marine Corps requirement to replace its medium lift
helicopter capability. The Marine Corps/OSD made the decision to
pursue tilt-rotor technology to meet this need and funding for
JVX (which later became the V-22) was included in the FY82
Federal budget. Congress subsequently authorized and
appropriated funds to initiate the program in FY82. Since that
time the program has enjoyed relatively strong support in
Congress. Reasons for this include the potential for civilian
applications, other service (i.e., Army, Air Force) requirements,
and the demonstration of a completely new and unique technology.
During this time the program also enjoyed strong support
from within the Defense Department, most notable the Secretary of
the Navy, John Lehman and the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
General Gray. In addition, the massive military buildup
initiated during the first Reagan administration under Secretary
of Defense Casper Weinberger ensured adequate program funding.
Despite the favorable climate for the program's initiation,
there were nay-sayers both at OSD and in Congress who felt the
program's costs and technical risks did not justify its
continuance. Against the program almost from its start was Dr.
David Chu, head of DOD's Planning, Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E)
shop. Secretary Lehman claimed that he "had to fight David Chu
17
every year on the V-22 [Ref. ll:p. 14]." However, Lehman's
considerable influence both at OSD and in Congress were
successful in keeping the program well supported at both levels.
Congress funded Full Scale development of the now "V-22" in FY86
and in May the Navy awarded a fixed-price incentive contract to
Bell/Boeing for three ground test articles and six flight test
aircraft. As an indication of the importance placed on the
program by the Marines Corps, it assigned as program manager,
Colonel Harry Blot, fresh from a successful tour as the AV-8B
program manager. In 1988 the V-22 was listed as the Marine Corps
as well as the Navy's number one aviation priority. The Navy's
number one aviation priority at this time was actually the ATA or
A-12. As a classified program, however, its status and hence
priority were not subject to public disclosure.
Problems with the program surfaced in 1987. A new Navy
Secretary, James Webb, under budgetary pressure, endorsed the
program but with considerably less enthusiasm than his
predecessor. The Army was having second thoughts about
continuing in the program due to uncertain cost projections [Ref.
12:p. 2] and the Air force reduced its buy from 80 to 50 special
operations force versions, again because of budget constraints
[Ref. 13:p. 12].
18
B. PROGRAM CANCELLATION AND THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO IT
(1988-1989)
Problems continued to grow for the V-22 program in 1988.
The Army officially dropped out of the program in February,
resulting in significant per aircraft cost growth. Additionally,
program delays and weight growth threatened the entire program
[Ref. 14:pp. 1-3]. The flight test program slipped from
mid-1988 to March of 1989, with the first flight of the V-22 on
19 March. Congress became actively involved for the first time
in 1988 in urging DOD to investigate the civil applications of
tilt-rotor technology as a means of lowering overall program
costs and "to give it some resistance to current uncertainty in
funding [Ref. 15:pp. 6-7]. M
In June of 1988 the OSD PA&E shop headed by Dr. Chu released
its report recommending the termination of the V-22 program in
favor of a more cost-effective all helicopter option. The report
remains highly controversial as it was developed "in house" by
the PA&E shop without input from either the Navy or the Marine
Corps [Ref. 16:p. 1-4].
The remainder of 1988 was spent investigating various
contracting options and funding plans to keep the V-22 a viable
program. By the end of 1988 there were definite signs that the
V-22 was in trouble. In November OSD cut the Navy's FY90 budget
request from $1.2 billion to $900 million, funding 21 rather than
the requested 36 production V-22's [Ref. 17: pp. 3-4]. The Marine
Corp, however, still considered the V-22 its "highest priority
19
aviation program [Ref. 18:p. 17]." In March of 1989 the
Secretary of the Navy, William Ball, recommended a $1 billion cut
in funding and a one-year delay in start of production. The
Marine Corps opposed both the funding cut and the production
delay [Ref. 19:p. 7].
C. PROGRAM CANCELLATION AND SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
In April of 1989, the Secretary of Defense Cheney announced
the cancellation of the V-22 based primarily on the
recommendation of David Chu. As Dr. Chu stated in his earlier
PA&E report, "the V-22 was a cost prohibitive option compared to
an all helicopter buy of UH-60's and CH-53E's [Ref. 20:p. 18]."
An amended FY90 budget was submitted to Congress in May of 1989,
deleting all funding requests for the V-22 and, instead,
requested funding for a new medium lift replacement alternative
study (presumably Chu's all-helicopter option) [Ref. 21:p. 27].
Congressional response to Cheney's cancellation move was
slow to materialize, by June the House Armed Services
Sub-Committee on R&D had voted to shift $351.8 million from the
B-2 and SDI programs to the cancelled V-22 program for FY-90
[Ref. 22:p. 1354]. Congressional support for the V-22, while
always strong, increased markedly from June through the end of
the year.
Representative Weldon and Senator Specter of Pennsylvania
became the primary leaders of a growing coalition of congressmen
who strongly supported continued V-22 development. By the end of
20
1989 this coalition included over 125 members of the House and 20
Senators
.
By November both the House and the Senate had included full
R&D funding in their FY90 budgets despite OSD ' s request for the
program's cancellation. Production funding, however, remained
tentative. A list of those supporting the V-22 is presented in
Appendix C.
Congress provided $255 million in RDT&E funding for FY90, as
Rep. Foglietta (PA) said, to "allow the Osprey program to fly for
another year and to sell itself to the Defense Department [Ref.
23:p. 5]." As part of the FY90 authorization and appropriations
bill, Congress also directed OSD to complete a Cost and
Dperational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) study of the V-22
program. The Institute for Defense Analysis was tasked with
analysis of the V-22, focusing on amphibious assault in a hostile
environment, long-range special operations, over-the-horizon
Landings, subsequent operations ashore, logistical resupply to
forward deployed forces and self-deployment missions.
In December, Secretary Cheney ordered the cancellation of
5344 million in FY89 advance procurement contracts for the V-22
($260 million of which had not been spent). This decision set
Dff a storm of criticism from Congressional supporters. The
iecision to terminate existing FY89 contracts was termed by Rep
tfeldon as a "blatant disregard of the defense authorization
process and for congressional will." By cancelling the V-22
procurement Weldon said, "Secretary Cheney displayed the ultimate
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in arrogance by trying to administratively subvert the defense
budget process while Congress was in recess [Ref. 24"p. 24]."
Weldon further stated that "the cancellation decision while
Congress was in recess would further galvanize congressional
support and damage the Pentagon's reputation on the Hill [Ref.
25 :p. 40]."
D. 1990 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
In January, still reeling from the decision to cancel FY89
procurement contracts, Congressional supporters tried to
determine the legality of Secretary Cheney's cancellation order.
Despite their anger with OSD, however, most supporters agreed to
abide by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) COEA
recommendations which were due to be released in April. In the
interim, Rep Weldon continued to solicit support for the program
and to lobby fellow congressman. Calling the Pentagon "penny
wise and pound foolish" he asked for a re-examination of the PA&E
report, arguing that life cycle cost analyses would show the V-22
less expensive [Ref. 26:p. 193].
The PE&E report based much of its conclusions on the
technique on dual slinging heavy vehicles on CH-53E helicopters,
thus decreasing transport times and/or reducing the number of
required helicopters. In testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee On February 20th, General Gray said, "I
consider this whole dialogue of dual sling options totally
ridiculous, it has nothing to do with coming from the sea in a
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wide variety of scenarios... it has nothing to do with
warfighting. It is totally ridiculous and tactically flawed"
[Ref.27:p. 6]. General Gray went on to say that a 1989 DOD study
found that the helicopter option would cost $6 billion more than
the V-22 option.
In April, a study commissioned by Bell-Boeing and conducted
by the BDM corporation found the V-22/CH-53E mix vastly superior
in combat effectiveness to the all helicopter option but $7
billion more expensive. This was based on a fleet on 602 V-22's
[Ref.2:p. 93-94]. The IDA report was also completed in April as
mandated by Congress. However, OSD did not release its findings
to Congress until mid-May. Because the report's V-22 findings
were in favor of the V-22, supporters in Congress accused
Secretary Cheney of trying to willfully suppress its results. A
discussion of the IDA study is contained in Chapter V of this




TABLE I. SUMMARY OF IDA CONCLUSIONS.
MARINE CORPS MISSIONS
* GREATER SURVIVABILITY OF V-22 PROVIDES THEM A SLIGHT TO
MODERATE ADVANTAGE IN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT MISSION
* V-22 IS MOST COST EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUSTAINED
OPERATIONS, HOSTAGE RESCUE/RAIDS AND OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT
** A NEW HELICOPTER SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO MARINE CORPS
REQUIREMENTS IF WILLING TO START NEW DEVELOPMENT
MARINIZE CH-47, IF PROBLEMS WITH QUADRICYCLE GEAR CAN BE
OVERCOME AT LOW COST
COMBINATION OF SMALLER HELICOPTERS IS REQUIRED TO CARRY
TROOPS AND CH-53's ARE NEEDED TO SATISFY MEDIUM LIFT
REQUIREMENTS
(** THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE ALTERNATIVES TO THE V-22)
OTHER SERVICE MISSIONS
* V-22 IS MORE COST EFFECTIVE THAT HELICOPTER ALTERNATIVES FOR
SPECIAL OPERATION, SEARCH AND RESCUE, AND DRUG INTERDICTION
MISSIONS
* S-3B IS MORE COST EFFECTIVE THAT SV-22 FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE
MISSION
NEAR TERM COSTS
* HIGHER PROCUREMENT COST OF V-22 LEADS TO LARGEST NEAR TERM
COSTS OF ALL THE ALTERNATIVES.
In June the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense,
led by Senator Spector, held hearings on the "IDA study of the
V-22 Osprey." Others providing testimony included deputy
commander for warfighting General Pittman, USMC , who said; "he
initially opposed the V-22 but now calls it indispensable" and
went on to say that the V-22 would have saved lives in Panama.
Dr. Simmons, head of the IDA study presented its results and
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answered questions from the subcommittee. In rebuttal, Assistant
Secretary Chu presented OSD's position with regard to IDA's
findings. Dr. Chu disagreed with many of the assumptions used to
generate IDA's conclusion and was of the opinion that the high
ap-front costs of the program do not justify its continuance. Of
all those testifying before the subcommittee only Dr. Chu ' s
remarks were against the V-22.
Both the House and Senate embraced the findings of the IDA
report as justification for continuing the V-22 program. All
nembers of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee expressed
either strong or at least general support for the program's
:ontinuance
.
Based on the positive findings of the IDA report,
Congressional supporters developed plans to insert funding into
:he FY91 budget over the objections of Secretary Cheney,
lowever, Defense Department spokesman, Pete Williams, said in a
L8 May press briefing, that "long-run cost arguments for the V-22
:ilt-rotor have already been rejected and will not prevail if
bhey are the basis for an anticipated reinstatement
recommendation from the IDA report [Ref. 30: pp. 288-289].''
Representative Weldon blamed Secretary Cheney's
inwill ingness to consider reinstating the program on Dr. Chu who,
le said, "has always been out to kill the V-22, and when he got
access to a new Secretary who needed to make some quick cuts in
30 days, he got his chance [Ref. ll:p. 101].
"
25
The remainder of the year was spent arguing the pros and
cons of the IDA report and the cost effectiveness of the V-22.
Congress continued its strong support for the program while
Secretary Cheney remained resolute on its cancellation. In the
end Congress approved an FY91 budget which included $238 million
for RDT&E and $165 million for long lead item procurement.
E. 1991 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
1991 started much the same way as the previous year with the
Defense Department submitting its FY92 budget with no V-22
funding. Congress, fearful that Secretary Cheney would not spend
appropriated FY91 funds, closely watched the V-22 program [Ref.
31:p. 39].
In April, a Joint Hearing of the Procurement and Research &
Development Subcommittees was held to review the V-22 program.
Martin Ferber, Director of Navy Issues at GAO, delivered a report
on the status of the program [Ref. 32:p. 60]. Several areas of
concern were addressed but were felt to be within the
capabilities of the contractors to fix. It was felt that the
aircraft could go into pilot production in FY92 if long lead
procurement funding was provided by July 1991. Program manager
Colonel Jim Schaeffer concurred with the GAO report and testified
that, "The program is still in the developmental stage and,
being a developmental program, problems will be identified.
Correction of deficiencies was to be incorporated in a concurrent
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pilot production lot of 12 aircraft but that contract was
terminated.
"
Termination of the authorized and appropriated production
contract was the topic of many of the members' remarks. They
accused Secretary Cheney of exercising a line item veto. R&D
Chairman Ron Dellums said, "In effect, the Department of Defense
is exercising a line item veto of Congress's intent, and that, as
we all know, is against the law." Congresswoman Lloyd said of
the Department's actions, "In my judgement, the cancellation
amounts to an unconstitutional attempt to exercise a line item
veto. This is unacceptable." Congressman Dellums also
complained that the Navy was not treating the V-22 as a major
procurement program and had yet to assign a Program Executive
Officer (PEO) . Congressman Bennet put it this way, "Maybe the
object of the exercise down there (at OSD) is to shoot this snake
in its hole, no matter what." Throughout the hearings every
congressman expressed at least moderate support for the program
while most strongly supported its continuation.
Only the Defense Department's Comptroller and chief
financial officer, Sean O'Keefe, was critical of the program.
While he acknowledged that the program was not cancelled because
of technical concerns, he stated that the Secretary of Defense
feels that the program is too expensive, most specifically in the
short term. As a compromise, he said that DOD is willing to
continue RDT&E efforts as mandated by Congress but that the
Secretary remains firmly opposed to procurement. He promised
that OSD would release previously held FY91 funds to the Navy to
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continue the RDT&E effort but that beyond that, nothing else was
planned. He also requested $50 million to study alternatives to
the V-22 for the Marine Corps medium lift mission.
In related testimony before the Senate Appropriation
Committee, General Gray, the Marine Corps Commandant, denied the
Marine Corps was lobbying on behalf of the V-22 and demanded to
know "who the hell" in the Marine Corps was doing the lobbying.
He demanded a list of names, calling it a matter "of integrity
and honor [Ref. 33:p. 87]." Despite Gray's denial, congressional
sources say that it is well known that the Marine Corps strongly
support the V-22 and would like to see the program continue.
F. FY 92 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
Congress passed its Defense Appropriations and Authorization
bill in late November 1991 and it is generally hailed a victory
for the V-22. It provided $790 million (including $165 million
of prior year procurement funds) to embark on Phase II full scale
engineering and manufacturing development. Three pilot
production aircraft were authorized to incorporate engineering
changes identified during flight testing. Additionally, it
directed the Navy to provide a Test and Evaluation Master Plan
TEMP by 1 May 1992 and report results of current testing to
Congress by 15 April 1992. Finally, the bill prohibited the
Navy from investigating V-22 alternatives until the results of
Phase II were available.
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V. V-22 VERSUS ALTERNATIVES
i. INTRODUCTION
The economy of the United States continues to slip into the
frasp of a recession and the Great Bear of Russia is taking on a
role more like a Teddy Bear. What should the Defense Department
[DOD) do? They are running out of excuses to "spend the Big
Sucks so they can have the best toys." One such area of
controversy is the V-22 Osprey which touts some of the newest
lost sophisticated technology available today. Paradoxically, it
.s not the DOD trying to spend too much money, it is Congress
:elling DOD to spend money on a program DOD wants to cancel.
Who is correct? Does Congress see something in the Defense
)lan that DOD doesn't or is it just another case of parochial
.nterests coming to the surface? Has DOD carefully weighed all
ispects of the Defense plan and made their cuts or did they find
>ne big ticket item that would solve their budget crunch? This
:hapter will delve deeply into some of these questions.
The V-22 was originally designed with the following missions
.n mind:











Combat search and rescue (CSAR)
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
U.S. Air Force Missions
Special Operations
Other Agencies and Missions
U.S. Coast Guard search and rescue (SAR)
Drug enforcement
Due to the budget constraints in recent years the interest
of the Army and Navy has decreased, leaving the Marine Corps
missions as the primary focus of the V-22 program.
The three studies of interest which pertain to these
missions are the "Institute for Defense Analysis Study of the
V-22 Osprey" [Ref. 34:p. 71], "Effectiveness of Tilt-rotor
Aircraft in Support of Ground Combat" report [Ref: 35 :p. 52] by
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and BDM




This study was performed under the auspices of the U.S.
Department of Energy and was sponsored by Bell-Boeing. It
considered only the operational capabilities of the V-22 and was
limited to a comparison between the abilities of a combination of
V-22/C-53E and of CH-60 (S) /CH-53E . The focus of the "study was to
determine what difference increased payload, speed, range and
hardness make in supporting Marine Corps amphibious assault and
reinforcement missions. The outcome of this study was quantified
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in terms of battle outcome and attrition to air defenses. The
comparison was broken up into two subdivisions classified by the
make-up of the aircraft fleets. The first subdivision was for an
equal lift capacity. This consisted of 60 V-22 and 20 CH-53E and
was compared to 36 CH-60(S) and 52 CH-53E. The second
subdivision was for equal cost fleets. The CH-60 (S) /CH-53E fleet
remained the same while the number of V-22's was reduced by 12
aircraft (48 V-22 and 20 CH-53E)
.
The scenario for the study was a U.S. Marine Expeditionary
Unit (MEU) in Lebanon as part of a UN peacekeeping force. A MEU
is approximately one infantry battalion in strength, with normal
reinforcements including a tank platoon. Political events in the
Middle East have prompted Syria to deploy an armored column to
seize the Beirut-Damascus Highway. The MEU is ordered to block
the movement, but it is recognized that it does not have
sufficient combat to power to do that unassisted. A USMC
expeditionary brigade (MEB) is available for reinforcement, but
must be vertically-lifted from amphibious ships if it is to reach
the MEU in time. Two infantry battalions could be lifted
directly to the MEU ' s location, the third battalion and the
heavier equipment would be landed in Beirut and would proceed
overland to the MEU. The lift aircraft must traverse indigenous
area defenses in Lebanon controlled by unfriendly forces.
Close-air support is not available to either side.
The two graphs detailed in Figure 1 depict the balance of
all systems (right) and combat power (left) available to a
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ground commander (designated blue force for the purpose of this
study) throughout the battle.
The conclusions drawn from the study in the equal lift and
equal cost scenarios are three-fold. First, as Figure 1 shows,
the V-22/CH-53E equal lift fleet delivers two to three times more
combat power during the battle than the alternate fleet. The
equal cost fleet delivers less combat power than the equal lift
fleet, but much more that the helicopter fleet. The V-22 fleet
delivers the combat force reinforcements more than twice as fast
as the alternates and thereby permits better utilization of the
weapon systems.
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Figure 1. Buildup of Marine ground forces
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Figure 2 depicts the correlation of forces and means (COFM)
,
also known as the relative combat power ratio (red, blue) , as a
function of time. The LLNL study used Soviet weighting criteria
to develop a simplified Soviet style COFM. Interestingly, Soviet
doctrine specifies that if the COFM falls below 1.8 the
probability of success would be jeopardized. As can be seen, the
reduction of red force relative strength (below 1.8) only
occurred in the V-22/CH-53E combination. Figure 2 shows the V-22
is able to reinforce the Blue forces quickly enough that the Red
force's (Blue force's opposition) forward momentum is dissipated
and the balance of forces is changed from one favoring the Red
forces to one favoring the Blue forces. This is never the case


















Figure 2. Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM).
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Third, as Figure 3 shows, the V-22 losses to ground-based
air defense are at least ten times less than that of the two
other aircraft examined in the study. This fact is attributed to
the intrinsic hardness of the V-22 and its greater speed. The
V-22 fleet also experienced a smaller loss of CH-53E due to the
fact that they were only needed for the heavy-lift missions.
200






Figure 3. Aircraft vulnerability to land-based air defense.
C. IDA STUDY
The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) study, "Assessment
of Alternatives for the V-22 Assault Aircraft Program," addressed
all the reasonable V-22 alternatives. This list included the
CH-53E+, CH-46E+-, CH-60(S), New Helicopter (Boeing Model 360),
EH-101 (UK/ITALY), CH-47M, and Super Puma (France). The IDA
study was a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA)
.
34
fhe missions that the IDA study addressed are listed in Table II
[Ref. 37:p. 32].
TABLE II. MISSIONS EXAMINED BY IDA STUDY.
Marine Corps Other Service or Agency
- AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT - COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
(INCLUDING OVER-THE- (NAVY)
HORIZON LANDINGS)
- LONG RANGE SPECIAL
- SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS OPERATIONS
ASHORE (INCLUDING RESUPPLY
TO FORWARD DEPLOYED - DRUG INTERDICTION
FORCES
- ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
- DEPLOYMENT MISSIONS (NAVY)
- HOSTAGE RESCUE OR RAID
>
Cost Comparisons.
The first item to be considered is the cost comparison
>etween the V-22 and its alternatives. It is clearly seen in
:igure 4 that the V-22 is significantly more expensive both in
ecurring flyaway costs (which includes recurring management,
.ardware, software and configuration change costs) and average
rocurement cost (which includes recurring flyaway costs plus
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Figure 4. Unit Procurement Costs.
The V-22 average procurement cost is about $35 million with
the next most expensive aircraft (CH-53E) averaging $25 million.
The large V-22 cost can be traced to the additional expense
incurred in the flyaway cost component of the program cost; in
particular, the digital avionics and fly-by-wire flight control
system. The V-22's fully integrated cockpit is one of the most
advanced of any military aircraft. The extensive use of
multifunctional (full color) displays (as alternatives to
analogue dials and gauges) and digital flight management systems
contribute significantly to flight safety, mission capability and
survivability. However, the additional cost is not small.
2. Sustained Operations.
The next mission that was examined was the sustained
operations mission. Figure 5 shows the comparative results. In
this scenario the aircraft would be used to support combat
operations ashore. The measure of effectiveness in this scenario
36
'as the number of equivalent pay loads that could be delivered per
.ay over a 30-day period. The black column represents a scenario
rith flat terrain, a fast threat response and half single
ling/half double sling for heavy loads. The white column
epresents rolling terrain, slow response and all double sling
oads . Again the V-22 proves to be a more capable platform.
700 1
V-22 NEW CH-4711 CH-«0(Sy CH-48€W PUUA/ EH.101/ CURRENT
HELO CH-53E* CH-53E*. CH-S3E* CH-53E+ CAPABILITY
?igure 5. Sustained Operations.
Other Mission Scenarios.
The remaining Marine Corps missions that were considered in
he report supported the same conclusions as the preceding
cenarios. The Hostage rescue scenario showed that the V-22
ould operate from a substantiality greater distance (greater
tandoff distance) and had a 5-to 12-hour advantage in the amount
f time it would take to reach the hostage site from the same
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starting position. In the deployment mission the V-22 was able
to self deploy (start, take off and land without auxiliary
machinery) therefore reaching the theater of operation sooner,
intact and ready to deploy troops. In operations involving
extended range, conventional helicopters often require refueling
at the deployment point. The V-22's characteristics allows
planners extended range/endurance flexibility. Additionally, the
V-22 does not require an external auxiliary power unit, or
additional equipment/personnel to fold the rotors.
Summarizing the results for Other Service or Agency mission
capabilities, the V-22 was found to be more cost-effective than
helicopter alternatives for special operations, search and
rescue, and drug interdiction missions.
4. In Conclusion.
Throughout the IDA study, the V-22 is shown to be the most
capable alternative to the present assets. It should be noted
that all of the proposed helicopter alternatives also provided
increased capability over present fleet assets. The major draw
back to the V-22 at this time is that its higher procurement
costs lead to the largest near-term costs.
D. BDM INTERNATIONAL STUDY
Using 1990 's data, BDM International conducted a combat
effectiveness analysis based on government approved data and used
a vertical assault scenario representative of a mid— intensity
conflict in which three Marine battalions were landed ashore.
The measures of effectiveness (MOE) were:
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a. Aircraft availability for subsequent operations
b. Productivity, combat power build up ashore over time
c. Survivability, losses of aircraft, Marines, and helo
deployable equipment to enemy ground based air defenses
AIHCHAf T STATUS
T7\ MAINTINAMCI MOD £3 COMIAUOSS | SURVIVING
V-22/CH-53E H 60/CH 53E H 60/OH 53E
FORCE DOUBLE SLING SINGLE SLING
igure 6. Aircraft Availability.
VA V 22 /CH S3 FORCE H60/CH-S3E
SINGLE SLING
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FORCE SINGLE SUNG DOUBLE SLING
igure 8. Aircraft Losses.
The BDM study compared a fleet of V-22 ' s/CH-53E' s to an all
elicopter fleet of H-60 ' s/CH-53E' s . The fleet size was
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determined by the number of deck spots available on the
amphibious ships supporting the simulated operation. As Figures
6, 7 and 8 illustrate, the V-22 was found to be superior to the
all helicopter fleet in each of the MOE examined [Ref. 28:pp.
14-19]. Specifically:
a. Figure 6 illustrates that only the V-22/CH-53E fleet
had sufficient aircraft available after the initial assault
to support subsequent operations.
b. Figure 7 illustrates that the V-22/CH-53E fleet
delivered twice the number of troops, combat power and
tonnage in the critical initial 60-90 minutes of the
assault
.
c. Figure 8 illustrates the survivability of the
V-22/CH-53E fleet, compared to the all helicopter fleet, it
was superior by a factor of 3 : 1, and by 7:1 when carrying
troops
.
E. SUMMARY OF LLNL, IDA AND BDM STUDIES
In summary, these three studies show that the V-22*s speed,
range and survivability advantages would enable even a reduced
fleet to be more effective than all the proposed helicopter
alternatives in each of the four Marine missions examined. Also,
the V-22 delivers more combat power to the battle area faster
than the helicopter fleet and, has a significantly smaller
attrition rate in battle.
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F. V-22 PECULIAR SUPPORT EQUIPMENT COMPARISON
As part of the V-22 Full Scale Development (FSD) program,
/alidation of the reliability characteristics of key aircraft
components began in October 1986. The V-22's logistic support
resource requirements were also being validated during the FSD
program. The V-22 is designed to be compatible with a wide range
of current government support equipment (CSE) . Further, it is
lesigned to require substantially fewer pieces of peculiar
(unique) support equipment (PSE) than current operational
equipment . This was done to reduce maintenance requirements as
•/ell as enhance tactical mobility and reduce demands on airlift
ind sealift assets. As Table III shows, the V-22 would enter
fleet operations with significantly fewer items of required
peculiar equipment. Bell-Boeing is using the flight test program
:o validate requirements for both CSE and PSE to support the V-22
'ABLE III. V-22 PECULIAR SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (PSE) COMPARISON.
ORGANIZATIONAL INTERMEDIATE





* Fleet aircraft data from NAVAIR records
** Actual count, less 16 inventory items (covers, tiedowns, downlock pins, etc.)





G. SPECIFIC INCIDENTS WHICH NEEDED THE V-22
Following are several incidents in which the V-22 would have
been a significant advantage. The brief incident descriptions
were created from various news articles, documentaries,
discussions and readings such as House Armed Services Committee
hearings in 1989/90 and transcripts of testimony to the GAO
Committee on Naval Aviation (April 1991).
1. Personnel Rescue
In 1980, Operation Eagle Claw, the attempted rescue of the
American hostages in the Tehran Embassy failed. The entire raid
could have been accomplished with a special operations force in
tilt-rotors alone instead of four kinds of aircraft and a split
second timetable of coordination of all four services. The raid
would have been done in eight hours instead of the planned 35,
with a far higher probability of success.
In 1983, a Navy pilot was shot down over Syria. Instead of
being recovered in 20 minutes with a strike rescue V-22, he
became an international incident, a lingering political
embarrassment to the government.
On 25 October 1983, Operation Urgent Fury sent an assault
force into Grenada. Operational specialists say that had we used
a force of V-22 aircraft, staged from nearby islands, the
operation might have been completed in two days instead of three,
with more surprise, greater precision and perhaps less loss of
life. More importantly the students could have been rescued
almost immediately after the arrival of U.S. forces. Rescue
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troops could have been delivered directly to the campus using the
VTOL-capable V-22.
In 1987, the Air Force/Navy raid on Libya was a great
success, but a plane was lost. The U.S. military had no way to
rescue the crew or even to quickly assess if they were alive. A
V-22 rescue aircraft would have been on the scene and the
incident would have passed [Ref. 6:p. 14].
2. Operation Desert Storm.
Rather than examine all aspects of Desert Storm in which a
/-22 could have operated (more effectively and efficiently than
:onventional helicopters), two phases of an amphibious operation,
issault and subsequent ashore operations will be briefly
iiscussed. A detailed analysis provided by Lieutenant General
Ceith Smith USMC (Ret) of the V-22's potential in Desert
3hield/Storm is included at Appendix D.
During the assault phase it is generally preferable to stay
is far as possible from landing areas defended by the enemy and
:o conduct assaults from over the horizon. This gives the
advantage of keeping support ships out of harms way for as long
is possible as well as providing an opportunity for tactical
ieception. Because of the limited range of the current shipborne
nedium lift capability, extensive and continued over the horizon
issault launch capability was not available to Desert Storm
Planners. However, the V-22 could have provided this. Despite
:his, the threat of an amphibious assault so preoccupied Iraqi
Planners, that they positioned troops and equipment for a primary
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coalition attack from sea, and thereby gravely miscalculated
their vulnerability from the northern, rear and western flanks.
During the subsequent operations ashore phase, pivotal to
success is the ability of an attacking unit to strike at a
decisive point, at the right time, and with the correct
forces/fire power mix to defeat the enemy. To accomplish this
task amphibious assault aircraft must have speed, range and
payload capacity to respond rapidly to an ever-changing battle
field situation. Helicopter operations in Desert Storm were
dictated as much by logistics as by tactics. The limited range
of the current U.S. military helicopter force required the
establishment of a succession of Forward Army and Refuelling
Ports from which close support for assault forces could progress.
Figure 9 graphically illustrates the advantage a V-22 has
over conventional aircraft. The flight envelope area surpasses
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Figure 9. V-22 vs Helicopter/Turboprop Flight Envelopes
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Because range depends on factors such as airspeed, fuel
apacity, load, hover requirements and take off/landing
configurations, specific comparisons between helo, turboprop and
tiltrotor would yield extensive data. Figure 10 provides a
comparison of the three aircraft categories, showing specific
range (nautical miles per hour of fuel) in relation to airspeed.
\dditional V-22 range data and mission endurance for the various
/-22 configurations is provided at Appendix B.
.30
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igure 10. Specific Range (NM/LB Fuel) to True Airspeed.
As the coalition forces clearly demonstrated during Desert
Storm, a force that can operate effectively at night and during
idverse weather conditions has a distinct advantage over those
who are limited in mobility and daylight fighting capability,
although the current helicopter fleet operated adequately in
South-West Asia, (intrinsic helicopter limitations not
withstanding) the presence of a V-22 component augmenting the
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conventional helicopter fleet would have provided battle planners
with a force multiplier factor of enormous benefit both at night
and during adverse weather.
3. Conclusions.
All of these scenarios; MEU in Lebanon, Operation Eagle Claw
and Desert Storm, could happen again and, in terms of specific
equipment, the U.S. military is no better prepared today than
they were then.
What value should be placed on the V-22's capabilities in
such scenarios? It is reasonable to conclude that the V-22 is
equally cost effective in the long-term and its performance
capabilities will offset its higher per unit cost. It would seem
therefore to be a strategic error to scrap the V-22 program in an
















VI. CIVILIAN AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES POTENTIAL
A. INTRODUCTION
Recognizing the vagaries of the Department of Defense
acquisition process and susceptibility to change for even the
most certain procurement agreements, Bell-Boeing has developed a
strategy which is designed to protect and continue the
development of the tilt-rotor concept in the event of the loss of
congressional support. Essentially. Bell-Boeing is marketing a
civil variant of the military V-22. In addition, there has also
been considerable effort made to secure overseas orders for the
military version.
Because of it military and civilian applications the V-22
has considerable export potential and provides the means for
shoring up the deteriorating American aviation industrial base.
The European share of the global jet transport aircraft market
has grown from approximately two percent in the early seventies
to nearly twenty percent by 1990 with signs of continued growth
[Ref. 38:p. 13].
B. FOREIGN INTERESTS
Typical of the burgeoning European Aerospace industries'
growing domination is the foreign rotorcraft manufacturers' share
of the world market which has grown steadily from a few percent
in the 1950 's to more than fifty percent today. The efforts of
the Bell-Boeing V-22 project made the United States a world
leader in tilt-rotor (and composite material) technology.
"If America is to maintain and strengthen our
competitive position, we must continue to not only
create new technologies, but to more effectively
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translate those technologies into commercial products
[Ref. 39:p. 20]."
However, it is considered in many circles, both industrial and
governmental that, if the military abandons the V-22, both
European and Japanese competitors will capitalize on its proven
potential
.
Three European aerospace companies, Aeritalia (Italy),
British Aerospace (England) , and Dornier Gmbh (West Germany) have
formed a consortium to assess potential military markets for the
tilt-rotor concept in Europe and throughout NATO. Japanese firms
including C. Itoh and Mitsue are currently assessing the
potential military market for tilt-rotor aircraft in Japan.
Another consortium, Eurofar, including French-based Aerospatial,
Gruppo Agusta in Italy, Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm Gmbh in West
Germany, Westland Helicopters Ltd in England and Construcciones
Aeronauticas SA in Spain, has organized to field a civilian
aircraft incorporating tilt-rotor technology [Ref. 40:p. 9].
Mr Jim McDaniel, Deputy Director of the Federal ..
Aviation Administration's Civil Tilt-rotor Program Office,
accurately reflects much of the current thinking regarding this
subject in his statement [Ref. 41:p 9]:
"I am convinced that the tilt-rotor is coming
without question. Whether it will be an
American-made tilt-rotor, there is some
quest ion. .. If we build it, we become the only
supplier of this thing five years ahead (of
Europeans and Japanese) , and we become an exporter
of this technology instead of an importer of
technology. It's going to help with our balance of
payments. It's going to help with our industrial
base... What we don't want to happen is for this
technology to go the same way as the videocassette
recorder technology, which was an American






and it would be a shame if that happened to the
tilt-rotor."
C. CIVILIAN OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS
Concurrent with military development, extensive technical
and market studies sponsored by Bell-Boeing, NASA, FAA, and DOD
have been carried out in order to determine how best to adapt
tilt-rotor technology to the highly lucrative civilian sector of
world aviation operations.
In June 1987, the final report of a NASA/FAA/DOD Civil
Tilt-rotor Study stated its support for a number of national
transportation goals and objectives, stating that the tilt-rotor
will, "Expand development of a nation's transportation
infrastructure, and reduce airspace/ground congestion problems."
This, along with other findings, supported a 1987 study from the
Aeronautical Policy Review Committee of the President's office of
Science and Technology Policy which specifically highlighted
tilt-rotor technology as playing a major role in an integrated
national air transportation system and recommended:
"...Civil derivatives of military tilt-rotors,
operating in the vertical or short takeoff modes,
are foreseen with the economy, productivity, and
maintainability of fixed wing passenger aircraft.
Advanced craft of this kind can provide improved
inter-city and inter-regional transportation,
reducing congestion in U.S. airports without major
investments in new runways..."
The report also noted that while airport congestion problems
are severe in the United States, they are worse abroad. European
and Japanese authorities have not only expressed great interest
in the timely availability of technology to relieve a heavily
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burdened transportation system, they also are investing in their
own tilt-rotor/tilt-wing technology development.
The following is a summary of the two principal findings .of
this study [Ref. 37:p. 42]:
1. Large export market: The market opportunity portion of this
study estimates an American commercial tilt-rotor could generate
$28 billion in exports in its first 10 years of availability,'
assuming timely development of the commercial tilt-rotor (CTR)
aircraft and an appropriate air and ground infrastructure.
2. National economic development: Manufacture of the CTR
aircraft and development of supporting vertiports has a positive
effect on national employment. Besides the direct CTR and
vertiport development jobs, employment diversification results as
manufacturing and service industries develop around the new hubs
of transportation (vertiports) . Quantifying national economic
development was not the principal focus of this 3tudy, but it can
be noted that industry would have to invest at least $2 billion
more to produce the United States' first commercial tilt-rotors.
Additionally, an initial network of 25 vertiports would require
private or local investment of $1 billion to $2 billion.
Relatively speaking, vertiports are economical to build and
conserving of land, as little as $40 million and 5 acres. A
system of vertiports would serve to distribute the demonstrated
favorable economic impact of urban airports throughout the
community. Considering multiplier effects, a study done for the











activity would be approximately $80 billion for every 1,000
commercial tilt-rotors produced.
A Bell-Boeing study titled "Civil Tiltrotor Missions and
Applications" (February 1991) suggests that the commercial
tilt-rotor could enjoy a substantial short-haul and commuter
market. Much of this traffic could be diverted to tilt-rotors,
which do not require runways. Freed-up runway slots can be made
available for more efficient longer flights by larger jets. The
useful life of crowded airports could therefore be extended.
Expense and land use could be minimized by locating vertiports
over freeways, railroad yards, piers, etc. Small urban airports
might be suitable in lieu of vertiports in some locations.
Expensive construction of new runways and new airports
environmentally difficult in most urban areas - could be
postponed or eliminated.
D. TECHNOLOGY ISSUES
The combined postwar investment of the U.S. aerospace
industry and the U.S. Government in tilt-rotor research and
development exceeds $2.5 billion [Ref. 42:p. 6], From this
foundation, tilt-rotor technology is ready to move to the. next
,
logical phase, which includes two separate but complementary
,
activities :
(1) Initiation of production of a military version to meet
the government ' s needs
.
(2) An iterative program to demonstrate tilt-rotor
technology to the commercial marketplace.
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There are striking differences between commercial and
military tilt-rotor aircrafts stemming from the V-22 military
mission requirements. Meeting military requirements
significantly increases fuel consumption, adds structural weight,
and adds complexity. Requirements such as MILSPEC damage
tolerance features, infrared sensors, combat related avionics,
rear loading ramps, folding rotors and other mission specific
equipment all increase the cost to build. A commercial V-22
variant would be lighter, less complex and more efficient.
Additionally, there is no doubt that ultimate efforts toward
development of a commercial version will lead to design
improvements that can improve the quality and performance of
military tilt-rotors. Likewise, military production aircraft may
contribute to "proving" the tilt-rotor concept by demonstrated
success. Taken together, the safety, reliability, and cost
effectiveness of tilt-rotors could be verified.
Commercial airlines have underscored the importance of W
demonstrating and validating the commercial viability of the
tilt-rotor. They have expressed reluctance to commit to a
comparatively revolutionary vehicle such as the tilt-rotor until 'lie!
the technical, cost, and operational system risk issues have been ^
satisfactorily resolved [Ref. 43:p. 19].
Continued evaluation of the potential civil applications of
the tilt-rotor and continued development of tilt-rotor systems 1?a
,
and infrastructures is therefore required. This continued
effort, coupled with the experience gained with pre-production
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platforms such as the XV-15 and production V-22 aircraft, can
help establish the requisite levels of confidence in the
commercial marketplace and a basis for a decision leading to
production of the civilian tilt-rotor.
Beyond congestion relief, civilian tilt-rotors could be
available for service in these areas:
-Improved air travel and access to rural and isolated areas.
-Disaster Relief.




-Coast Guard, border patrol, and drug interdiction.
The technology to produce a successful commercial tilt-rotor
is clearly emerging. But focusing solely on the technology and
the aircraft, although they are important, is not sufficient. As
,
the world's civilian airspace system now exists, the tilt-rotor's
potential to reduce ground and air congestion cannot be realized
o| [Ref . 44: p. 31].
t! E. USE OF AIR SPACE ISSUES
Commercial fixed-wing aircraft need runways several thousand
ieet long, are limited to shallow approach paths, and operate
>e: :rom large, centralized airports; the entire airspace system has
jvolved around and is structured to those needs. Lacking an
.
lirspace infrastructure tailored to exploit its unique
apability, the tilt-rotor is "just another helicopter" operating




Without a paradigm shift, decades could pass before the
system would evolve to allow CTR ' s potential to be tapped. In
;
the interim, national resources will be wasted - in a holding-
stack over Chicago, waiting for a slot out of La Guardia, or
stuck in traffic on an access road to Washington's National
Airport
.
The question to be faced is: whose problem is air and ground
congestion? Air carriers claim that it is not theirs. The FAA I
charter is directed first to safety and second to capacity.
Airport operators' interests are local, not national, in scope.
Manufacturers build only those aircraft that airlines will buy.
F. CIVIL CONFIGURATIONS AND USES
In July 1987 Bell-Boeing commissioned a study into civil
tilt-rotor missions and applications [Ref. 43:p. 8]. Appendix C
shows civil tilt-rotor configurations developed for the study.
One configuration, the CTR-800 is based on the original XV-15
tilt rotor size; two configurations, the CTR-22A/B and CTR-22C,
are derivations of the V-22 military tilt-rotor; and two
configurations, the CTR-1900 and CTR-7500, are all new (but
technically feasible) civil tilt-rotors. In addition to the
airlines there are also world wide markets in the following
areas
:
1. Drug Enforcement. For drug enforcement work, speed, range,
and endurance are critical, as is the ability to take off and | ;:ns
land vertically (on unprepared surfaces). This mission would •'
involve interception and pursuit on the ground as well as in the















of launch time. The CTR-22A/B variant would be ideal for this
role as it has necessary range, speed, size, and its rear ramp
would facilitate the rapid loading and off loading of necessary
personnel. Additionally, the CTR-22A/B (being of military
descent) would have good ballistic tolerance against certain
weapon catagories.
2. Police. Additional to mission criteria required for drug
enforcement, police applications would be in the area of prisoner
transfer, high priority personnel transfer, airborne
patrols/surveillance, search and rescue, and SWAT operations.
The CTR/800 variant would be most applicable to these missions.
3. Coast Guard. Between 1978 and 1983, the U.S. Coast Guard
launched more that 145,000 aircraft rescue mission, mostly to
Locations within the 150 nautical-mile range of their HH-65
lelicopter. The tilt-rotors range and speed make it an ideal
alternative to the HH-65 in the search and rescue mission. The
/-22 has significantly more airborne endurance time and its
ill-weather capability and ability to hover without severe
j,j lownwash effects considerably improve chances of rescue success.
\s 91% of all short range recovery missions involve fewer that 10
people, the CTR-800 would be applicable to this mission.
1. Medical Evacuation. Because of conventional helicopter
onstraints in the area of range .and speed the tilt-rotor would
-
srovide vastly improved evacuation capability and reduced transit
i
..,:ime. Additionally, pressurizat ion and good ride quality would
enhance the ability of medical attendants to administer treatment
is well as provide a stable environment for the patient. With a
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range in excess of 600 nautical miles at the lighter mission
weight of a medical transport role, the service area of a base
hospital can be dramatically increased (and with it, increased
revenues). For the medical mission the pressurized CTR-800
would be appropriate.
5. Fire. Fire Departments use of VTOL aircraft for commander
control, personnel transfer, search and rescue missions is well
established. In most cases a small tilt-rotor with its speed and
range would ideally substitute for helicopters. For fire rescue
missions and smoke jumping operations the larger CTR-22 series
tilt-rotor would be ideal.
6c Public Service. In addition to the previous categories the
tilt-rotor would satisfy innumerable public service requirements
such as disaster relief.
G. TECHNOLOGY SPIN-OFFS
Much of the technologies used in V-22 production are also
being developed by the aviation industry at large. These
technologies include advanced cockpit displays, fly by wire and
advanced multiplex data base systems (avionics). There is also
the area of composite fiber construction in which the V-22 is a
trailblazer. Bell-Boeing have found that composite construction
provides strength, stiffness and corrosion resistance at nearly
25% less weight that conventional metal alternatives.
Interestingly, from a military and police point of view, research
has shown that composite materials have better ballistic













:ould provide technological spin-offs for both military and civil
iviation are [Ref. 45:p. 44]:
' Thrust power management systems






Fibre optic use in aircraft
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY APPLICATIONS
In addition to the previous mentioned civil applications,
ill of which apply to the Australian environment, the huge
indeveloped land mass that constitutes Australia's northwest
lictates that a rapid reaction capability to any developing
:hreat be included in the defense force structure. The current
•apid reaction of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) is centered
iround the Army's fleet of UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. The
IH-60's limited range, endurance, lift capability and personnel
:apacity constitute severe limitations on rapid reaction
>lanning. With major Army bases being located on the east coast
:he ADF needs VTOL aircraft with necessary range to reposition
:ombat into the remote northwest. The V-22 could do this,
'igure 10 shows the rapid self deployment range of an east coast
>ased V-22 fleet. A typical rapid deployment scenario would
nvolve 24 combat troops plus their equipment boarding each V-22
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in Brisbane, utilizing in-flight refueling or utilizing existing
fuel facilities at Alice Springs (Central Australia). The rapid
deployment force would be positioned anywhere on the north-west
coastline within 7 hours of departure.
MISSION PROFILE
* Vertical/Short takeoff Brisbane




* Vertical Short takeoff
Alice Springs
" Alice Springs - KJmberty
Plateau: 2.5 hours
* Deploy troops/equipment
and either remain in area






Figure 11. V-22 Rapid Self Deployment.
Another possible military application for the V-22 is in the
area of land-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) . For the
northern coastlines, particularly the sparsely populated and
mineral rich northeast and northwest, ASW presents unique
problems to the Australian defense planners. Australia does not
have an aircraft carrier, and long range fix wing ASW aircraft,
such as the Royal Australian Airforce's PC3 Orions, are limited
by the absence of active sonar and dipping capabilities. The V-22
ASW variant could provide those capabilities. This aircraft,
operating from established (or improvised) land bases, would
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significantly augment naval shipborne ASW facilities and, in its
capacity as a force multiplier, provide significantly increased
flexibility to battle planners. Figure 12 provides an indication
of V-22 land-based ASW coverage and time on station from the
cities of Broome in the west and Cairns in the east.
• HOOK
O Miai |oo V
Figure 12. V-22 Land-Based ASW Operations.
In addition to the rapid deployment and ASW capabilities of
the V-22, many (if not all) the mission capabilities required of
the V-22 by the U.S. military (details of which are included in
Chapter V) would be utilized by the Australian Defence Force and
other militaries throughout the world, thus providing significant
foreign military sales potential.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
:
A . SUMMERY
This thesis has provided a comprehensive overview of the
V-22 program. The origins of the program were discussed and the
Iranian Hostage mission was cited as graphic evidence of the need;
for a aircraft featuring the V-22's unique characteristics.
Program management is always pivotal to the success of a new ;
system and Chapter III of the thesis discussed the history of the
V-22 program management and, using Milestones terminology, traced




A more detailed analysis of the influences of various key
:eplayers in the development process; i.e. Congress, OSD and the
USN/USMC was given in Chapter IV. This chapter showed how the
V-22 program grew out of a Marine Corp request to replace its
medium lift capability and, despite strong support from personnel
such as John Lehman (Secretary of the Navy) and General Gray
(USMC Commandant), the program was destined to a life of
continual scrutiny cancellation and uncertainty. Various program
cancellation decisions were discussed as was Congressional action
during the period 1980 thru 1992. Throughout the program's
history Congressional support for the tilt-rotor has been second
only to Bell-Boeing's.
Alternatives to the V-22 were discussed in Chapter V. The A
cost question was discussed and the question asked "Is it worth
J





nade on the tilt-rotor concept and, more particularly the V-22,
two studies were cited in this chapter. The first, provided
inalyses of comparative performance of a combined V-22/CH-53E
Eorce and a CH-60 (s) /CH-53E force. The second study addressed
ill reasonable V-22 alternatives. Both of these studies
identified that the V-22's characteristics of speed, range, and
jurvivabil ity would enable a V-22 fleet to be more effective than
hiill proposed helicopter (VTOL) alternatives.
In a politico-financial climate which calls for military
jperational drawdown and decreased budgetary allocation, a system
nth purely military applications necessarily subjects itself to
; :he limitations such a climate imposes. Thus Chapter VI analyzed
;
e
;he civil potential of the tilt-rotor concept and its use by
;. foreign military services. The fact that considerable worldwide
.nterest in the tilt-rotor concept exists was also discussed.
Jith air traffic congestion (and its consequent pollution, both
loise and environmental) becoming an increasingly high priority
iroblem, innovative solutions must be found. The tilt-rotor
:oncept may well provide the answer as well as provide some
shoring up of the eroding U.S. aviation industrial base.
Japan's primary interest in the tilt-rotor would be to ease
:ivil air traffic congestion. In contrast, the Australian market
fould be much more diverse and offers considerable potential for
.
>oth initial sales of the V-22 in its current configuration as
/ell as ongoing sales as the aircraft develops. As proven with




component manufacture which could also take place in the V-22's
case .
The Australian military currently relies on a small fleet off
4 CH-47D Chinook helicopters to fulfill the VTOL medium lift
mission. This fleet is aging and is unable to satisfy the vast
number of medium lift and rapid deployment requirements of even a
low level conflict. Kangaroo '89, Australia's largest ever
peacetime exercise to that date, highlighted the severe
difficulties arising from limited medium lift capability [Ref.
46:p. 22]. With the land phase of the exercise being carried out
in northwest Australia it quickly became apparent that the lackf 11
of airfields, road and rail networks (the few that existed would J"
be susceptible to flooding) made fuel and ammunition resupply a
critically limiting factor in battle planning - the V-22 would'
have been ideally suited to the task of logistic support.
The SAR and ASW capabilities of the V-22 would be of
enormous benefit to the Royal Australian Navy. By utilizing its
advantage in speed and range its force multiplier potential
becomes apparent. Military V-22's would also be able to
effectively augment civil authorities in missions such as
disaster relief, drug enforcement, policing and fishery- patrol.
|
B. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding historical perspective illustrates the many
complexities outside the control of the program manager. In thel|:j
case of the V-22 the program manager has had very little effect
on the direction of the program. He has had to respond primarily
to outside events; specifically, the decision by Secretary Cheney
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to cancel the program and the subsequent decisions by Congress to
keep the program alive.
It is clear that the Defense acquisition process has been
anything but efficient for the V-22. It appears that Secretary
Cheney's desire to quickly kill the program and thus reap maximum
cost savings has been foiled. Even if the V-22 is ultimately
cancelled, over $3 billion dollars will still have been spent on
the program. Alternately, if the V-22 continues to production
the result will be a significantly reduced aircraft buy (231
iaircraft vice the original 657) and at a considerable growth in
l^unit cost.
The prospect of greatly constrained future defense budgets
make it apparent that the United State government agencies cannot
continue to waste billions of dollars arguing over a program's
viabi 1 ity
.
There is undoubtedly civil potential and this area needs to
a! be actively pursued. Despite the need for defense dollars to
initiate production, with successful marketing and proven ability
to fulfill civil missions private sector funding would be
forthcoming. There is also the consideration that if the
tilt-rotor' concept is not fully developed in the U.S., in all
likelihood Japan, Korea or Taiwan would produce the aircraft and
> thus reap the benefits of market share. To illustrate
established thinking and the Asian demand (and, by inference,
;, Europe) the 1992 Asian Vertiflite Seminar announced the need for
a helicopter expressway in the air as a solution to Japan ' 3
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chronic land-based traffic congestion. The plan calls for the
division of Japan into 600 sectors and the building of a heliport
in each sector thus establishing an airborne expressway which
could be used by the V-22. In addition, a Japanese industrialist
is quoted as saying, "If you produce the aircraft, we will buy
it. If you do not, I guarantee we will build it [Ref. 47:p.
20] ."
Given the shrinking defense dollars available in the 90's
and the desire to maintain a viable state-of-the-art defense
industrial base, programs must be designed which can take
advantage of potential Foreign Military Sales and more
importantly, commercial applications. This means that while the
V-22 program may not be entirely cost effective on military
grounds alone, the technology generated for the national
industrial base may be incentive enough to continue with the
program. The Defense Department, however, should not be made to
shoulder the entire financial burden of these development
programs. Congress should provide joint funding for "National
Technologies" programs such as the V-22 as a means of maintaining
the United States leading technological position among developed
countries .
In conclusion, for a variety of technological,
economic, and political reasons, the 1990's will be an era of
considerable change in the planning for and execution of naval
warfare. Older, well proven maritime strategies, tactics, and
weaponry will inevitably feel this impact and mounting challenges




anticipated. In order to confront and solve these problems, new






The V-22 is the first aircraft to be developed from the
ground up to serve the needs of all four U.S. armed services.
The V-22 is the first U.S. aircraft to be completely designed
by computer, rather than by engineering drawings produced by
hand
.
The V-22 is the first full-scale tilt-rotor development
program ever undertaken by an nation.
The V-22 is the first production aircraft whose airframe will
be fabricated almost entirely of composite materials, chiefly
graphite-epoxy solid-laminate structure. Only about 1,000 pounds
of metal will be used: mostly fasteners and copper mesh
laminated into the outer surfaces to provide lightning
protection.
The V-22 is the first U.S. major weapon systems procurement
program negotiated under new U.S. Navy acquisition policies that
require the contractors to finance and own the majority of the
tooling, a requirement that provides substantial savings to the
taxpayers
.
The V-22 is the first aircraft whose wing can be rotated
parallel to the fuselage in order to create a compact rectangle
necessary for operation and storage aboard ships.
The V-22 is the first fixed-wing aircraft to use
cross-connected propulsion systems that enables it to maintain
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STUDY OF THE V-22'S POTENTIAL IN DESERT SHIELD/STORM
By UCen. Keith Smith. U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
his article examines the potential
I deployment and employment ad-
vantages that a Desert Shield/
lorce equipped with the MV-22
could have provided compared to
tal medium lift helicopter force
was deployed. The analysis
y concerns substitution of CH-
d CH-53Ds in I Marine Expedi-
jforce (IMEF) with a force of MV-
ch would have provided a com-
| capability. It is also noted that
I advantages would accrue to the
imy if some UH-60s were sub-
^ith the MV-22.
; :cess of the five-month Operation
I Shield deployment and 100-hour
Storm campaign will result in
I and assessment of all aspects of
I years to come. Force structure
iron systems effectiveness will be
id in great detail for lessons
l While such studies will be invalu-
cmprove existing force composi-
Eeration Desert Storm will also
I in excellent opportunity to com-
pelopmen tal systems with the
•rated capabilities of currently
:y stems, The superb execution of
I rations allow them to serve as
I benchmarks to measure the ef-
e :ss of future programs.
DEPLOYMENT
kment of a large force is a compli-
id difficult operation at best.
t neld required the largest depioy-
U.S. forces since the Vietnam
II to ensure a reasonable prob-
f success, demanded that the
mems of the force were in place
itionally ready as quickly as pos-
; major pacing factors in the
:nt phase were the distances to be
i the number of C-5 and C-141
airlift sorties available. The
for space on those critical sorties





1st Kaneohe Alameda ! 2.075 8.3 hrs. 1






4th Cherry Pt. Bermuda Lajes 12.489 9.7 I j





7th Sigonella Saudi Arabia 1 1.806, 6.8 1
TOTAL 4i.o n
Figure 1. Kaneohe Bay Deployment





1st ElToro Tinker ChenvPt. 2,012 8.1
2nd Cherry PL Bermuda Lajes 2,489 9.7
3rd (crew rest
Laies)
4th Laies Bermuda Sigonella 1.969 7.4
5th Sigonella Saudi Arabia 1,806 6.8
TOTAL 32.0 5




C-5 Loads 18 -18
Aerial Tankers 10
Support Aircraft 15 +5
Cost to move ($ mil-
lions)
• 5J 3.2 -2.3
Time to load (days) 10 -10









Figure 3. Marine Deployment Summary. Marin* Aircraft could have been combat
ready two weeks sooner.
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that current medium lift helicopters re-
quired were of major proportion. Al-
though helicopters were high priority
items for early arrival in the objective
area, they competed with other high
priority forces for critical lift assets. Had
the MV-22 been available to the Desert
Shield force, it would have provided ap-
proximately the same lift capability. To
ensure time-distance equality in the com-
parison, the MV-22 aircraft are assumed
to have originated from the same stations
as did the actually deployed helicopters.
Twenty-four MV-22s were originated
from MCAS El Toro, CA. and 20 from
MCAS Kaneohe Bay, HI. for a total of 44
aircraft self-deploying. The remaining 16
New River-based MV-22s were assumed
to be sealifted with amphibious ships.
To enable self-deployment, the Osprey,
with four internal fuel tanks installed, has
a flight ferry (no payload) range of 2.100
NM with a 10 percent fuel reserve. Al-
though not required for Desert Shield
deployment, (See Figures 1 and 2) it is also
equipped for in-flight refueling.
The time to load factor in Figure 3 is the
hours required to load aC-5 with CH-46Es
or CH-53Ds. Trained personnel, special
tooling, ground handling equipment, and
ramp space availability were pacing fac-
tors. The comparison uses minimum in-
stead of actual Desert Shield deployment
times. During Desert Shield, the actual lift
by 10 C-5 equivalents of 12 CH-46Es and
12 CH-53Ds from El Toro took 41 days
from first airlift launch to last airlift land-
ing in Saudi Arabia. It should be noted.
however, if there were unlimited trained
personnel, special tools, ground handling
equipment, ramp space, and strategic lift
available, the El Toro lift would have used
only 25.5 hours from start to finish. Load
planning factors are as indicated in Figure
4 below.
Using the above example of self-deploy-
ment, the advantages to I MEF of an MV-
22 equipped force for Desert Shield would
have been:
• Combat ready in Saudi Arabia 14
days sooner than the CH^6/CH-
53D fleet






C-5 unload time (Hrs.)
Assembly time/Flight
check maintenance (Hrs.)
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Figure 5. CH-46E Vs V-22 Comparative Performance Data
• Deployment directly to dispersed
operational sites, avoiding airport
congestion
• Aircraft and flight crews prepared to
undertake the full range of medium-
lift missions on day of arrival
ARMY DEPLOYMENT
A brief examination of the U.S. Army
deployment indicates similar lift saving
advantages would have resulted with
some portion of the UH-60 force being
replaced with the MV-22. Actual airlifted
U.S. Army helicopter deployment of 105
UH-60S indicated utilization of 18 C-5
equivalents. The flow time for the air
movement was 39 days for the 101st Air
Assault Division. Fort Campbell, KY (90




Performance and employment ad-
vantages of the MV-22 are examined in
several mission areas: amphibious opera-
tions, tactical recovery of aircraft and per-
sonnel (TRAP), special operations (SOC),
and other related operations. A general
comparison of performance charac-
80
teristics ofthe CH-46E and MV-22 is c lofl
tained in Figure 5. These figures are i Ke






Although it was ultimately not requ ^
in Desert Storm, an amphibious task ft
(ATF) was prepared to conduct
phibious operations if directed. The (
•
coastline of Iraqi-occupied Kuv
presented an opportunity to facilitate
general offensive by outflanking the L :iit
fortified line facing U.S. forces in S;
Arabia, cutting major lines of c<
munication, and establishing a lodgrr
for follow-on introduction of coali
forces. In recognition of our amphibiJ
capability, Iraq deployed 60-68.000
sonnel to Kuwait's coastal region with
primary mission of establishing a deft
in depth against a possible landing. Ail
tionally, the beaches were mined exi •
sively. Within this scenario, the d V
vantages offered by an MV-22/CH I
force compared to an equal-lift H
I*
46E/CH-53D force in an amphibious*1
sault are examined. The speed, load, i
range capabilities combine to provide
overwhelming advantage. For exam < \
in order to land MEF assault elemut \





Enable) in a landing zone 20 NM in-
i a CH-46E/CH-53E force would
iv :o launch from a point no farther than
Mvf offshore: whereas, an MV-22/CH-
:lorce could launch at 75NM offshore,
k) NM inland, and still make the 90-
ire time requirement. The map, Fig-
l , superimposes these distances of
1 and 75 NM on the Persian Gulf in
e icinity of Kuwait and illustrates
M\i\ salient points:
; upper Persian Gulf is a relatively
and very shallow body of water,
sd with oil rig platforms that will
tively compress ATF maneuver
With exception of a deep water ship
iel leading into Kuwait harbor, iinac-
bly shallow water, in this case
\i, extends from about 10NM to
30NM offshore. Because of water depth
limitations, the only possible launch point
available to the CH-46 force at 25NM is
in the middle of the channel leading to
Kuwait port facilities. This would almost
completely eliminate maneuver room and
would place portions of the task force
about 12NM offshore and within range of
long-range artillery fire.
The map demonstrates the advantage in-
herent in the MV-22 force's capability of
launching at 75NM. The ATF would clear-
ly be beyond line of sight from the Iraqi
coastline and in water deep enough to
maneuver with reasonable safety. If the
ATF were to move in to a 50NM launch
point. Figure 7. it would still be comfor-
tably within the distance needed for an
Figure 7.
Figure 7.
OTH operation and yet maintain
maneuver room.
In summary, the MV-22 's greater speed,
range, and lift capacity would have
opened up most of Kuwait and southern
Iraq to the vertical envelopment arm of
amphibious exploitation without ap-
preciably hazarding the fleet These in-
creased capabilities would have seriously
complicated the Iraqi defensive arrange-
ments. Instead of concentrating only on a
coastal band about 20 miles wide, the
Iraqis would have, of necessity, had to
face the prospect of contending with land-
ings practically the length and breadth of
Kuwait and the southern portion of their
own homeland as well. In fairness, it must
be said that the CH-46 force could have
reached into Kuwait and undoubtedly was
prepared to do so, but, as the map shows,
only about half as far and at considerable




Unfortunately, the air-to-ground phase
of Desert Storm provided several oppor-
tunities to exercise the TRAP mission to
recover downed aircrewman. Many ef-
forts were successful—some were not. At
least some of the unsuccessful rescue at-
tempts, and some which were not at-
tempted, were due to the large distances
of the downed aircrew from friendly lines.
Figure 8 above shows the vastness of the
Desert Storm area and the disposition of
potential targets.
Given the assets that were available, the
probability of successful search and res-
cue within the majority of the area was
severely limited. During recent testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee. Army Gen. Carl Stiner stated.
"Special operations forces assigned to res-
cue American aircrews shot down inside
Iraq quickly came face to face with the
limitations of their helicopters."
Compared to the current force of CH-
46/CH-53s. the MV-22 would have
provided a significantly greater prob-
ability of rescuing andxetuming downed
aircrew with the least possible risk to
aircraft as a result of several performance
factors: range, speed and survivability.
The increased range advantage almost
doubles the area of coverage to include all
of Iraq. The MV-22 range capability is
such that after picking up the downed
aircrew, it could continue unrefueled into
Turkey, further enhancing survivability.
When the increased speed of the aircraft.
275kts. is added to the increased range and
considered with historical data that indi-
cates the probability of rescue decreases
significantly after the first hour on the
ground, the advantage of the MV-22 be-
comes overwhelming. Additionally, con-
sidering the emphasis during Desert
Storm on night TACAIR operations, the
probability of a single sortie being shot
down at night decreased as a result of the
cover of darkness. However, the frequen-
cy of night downings increased simply
H-53 CV-22
UNFUELED RADIUS 325 520











NIGHT/ALL WX/TERRAIN FOLLOWING LIMITED YES
MAX ALT (TRANSIT) 10.000 FEET 25.000 FEET
* Based on 88SNM mission, hover it midpoint exfiltrating one special forces team with equipment
personnel 4.000 lbs) with midpoint hover conditions. 4.000 feet 40C
,
Figure 9. Special Operations Mission performance comparison
because of the massive number of night
sorties. The night, adverse weather
capability of the MV-22 would have sig-
nificantly enhanced the ability to effect
successful rescues at night, thereby
providing an additional benefit of in-
creased survivability of the mission.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
CAPABLE (SOC)
The Osprey is ideally suited to the spe-
cial operations mission. Its speed, range,
and maneuverability allow a commander
to attempt missions, with reasonable cer-
tainty of success, that he would previously
have rejected out-of-hand. When Iraq is
examined with respect to distance, terrain
and the threat, it is evident that SOC mis-
sions previously regarded as "not doable"
are possible. On SOC missions such as
hostage rescue, special reconnaissance,
airfield seizure, and direct action against
such targets as SCUD sites, increased
capability means increased odds for suc-
cess. In many cases, helicopters simply
could not meet the vital requirements for
range, speed, survivability, hover power,
or transit altitude. Additionally, SOC for-
ces prefer to execute missions under cover
of darkness because of the clandestine
nature of most of their operations. There-
fore, it becomes very important to mission
success to have vertical lift capability that
has sufficient speed to infiltrate, ac-
complish the objective, and exfiltrate in a
relative short period, thus allowing
entire mission to be conducted
surprise and stealth under cover of d
,
ness. For instance, to operate ags
some of the key targets north of Bagh
would require helicopter-borne fo
over six hours of just transit time t >
northern Saudi Arabia to north of 8; <
dad and return. The MV-22 could peril
the same mission in half the time, i
SOC mission comparison in Figure 9
As an example, the 855NM mis \
depicted in Figure 9 done by he lice t
would require some part in daylight, iv
would require a forward area refuen
point and/or numerous air refuelingsi
ditional risk factors that raise the o
against a successful operation. The 1
22 on such a mission would require I
two nighttime refuelings over frieil




MedEvac. The time elapsed betv
injury and arrival at appropriate mec
facilities has been proven to be dird
linked to mortality rate. Speed advan
of the MV-22 alone is significant eno
to save lives. During Desert storm, i
lied forces had experienced the exten
casualty rate predicted by some, mec
facilities in northern Saudi would rV;
quickly filled to capacity. The ranged
vantage of the MV-22 would have
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evacuation from front-line aid sta-
i
directly to medical facilities in
I Saudi or hospital ships.
mical and Biological Survey
tions. Had Iraq utilized chemical
ological (CB) weapons as it had
ned. a fast, responsive, accurate
irvey to determine areas con-
ted and the degree of contamina-
ould have been of utmost impor-
Currently. CB surveys are done by
ir and ground vehicles. Both not
squire special monitoring equip-
but also that the individuals and
lent conducting the surveys must
tected individually since current
Dters are not sealed against agent
ition. The aircraft itself will be-
contaminated inside and out and
a hazard until decontaminated—
a
It. dangerous task. The MV-22,
s built-in chemical and biological
lion systems, could have ac-
shed these surveys faster and with
srable more safety than helicopters.
p<antly. the MV-22 would receive
K irface contamination, which is easi-
y |
safely removed. Interiors, critical
nents. and most important, crew
jissengers are located inside the
i which is sealed against NBC agent
won.
Speed Resupply. During Opera-
esen Storm, planned use of high-
imponents. weapons, and ammuni-
)uld have provided coalition forces
"icant advantage if major resistance
itenalized. Not only would such
ikely have been consumed rapidly
and in large quantities, but the distances
over which resupply would have had to
have been transported were vast, and
availability of high-grade surface
transportation systems scarce. Large
quantities of missiles, fire control, night
vision and other high-tech equipment
would have been used on a daily basis.
Since all these items were in short supply
and relatively fragile, normal truck
transportation systems would not have
been appropriate or have met time re-
quirements. The ability of the MV-22 to
fly long distances at high speed and then
land vertically in the vicinity of front-line
units would have made it the ideal aircraft
for the rapid resupply mission.
Insertion of a Blocking Force. The
synergistic value of speed, range, payload.
survivability, and a relative stealth ad-
vantage as a result of a reduced sound
footprint that the MV-22 brings to the
battlefield offers the commander
maneuver warfare opportunities that are
not existent in the current force. The resul-
tant advantages offer the potential of ex-
panding the battlefield, gaining decisive
surprise, and maintaining momentum
beyond the enemy's abilu\ to cope The
capabilities of ihe-MV-22 virtually limit
the opportunities for maneuver warfare
only to the imagination of the commander.
CONCLUSION
If the MV-22 had been available for the
CH-46E/Ch-53D and Army UH-60 mis-
sions in Desert Shield/Storm operations,
it would have enormously improved
deployment flexibility, reduced deploy-
ment costs, and significantly reduced the
time for Marine and Army aviation units
to become combat ready in-country.
During operation Desert Shield/Storm, in
every operational employment scenario
considered, the MV-22. in concert with
other helicopter and fixed wing assets.
would have provided a quantum increase
in balanced force effectiveness. The war-
fighting advantages of the MV-22. with its
significant increase in range, speed, and
survivability, would have been a sig-
nificant force multiplier. It would have
added a whole new dimension to existing
SOC capabilities and could have rescued
a downed aircrew twice as fast, with a
higher probability of success, than any
existing aircraft. Overall, the margin of
superiority that the Osprey could have
provided in force maneuverability and
Support has been the dream of wamors
over the entire history of conflict. The
bottom line: the MV-22 Osprey will







• New High-Wing Design
CTR 1900 New Tiltrotor
(19 Passengers)
* 4
• New Low-Wing Oesign






• New Pressurized Fuselage
CTR 7500 New Tiltrotor
(75 Passengers)
• New Low-Wing Design
"Civil Tilt-rotor Missions and Applications: A Research
Study" by Boeing Commercial Airplane Company dated July 1987.
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